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Abstract. Strategic management is vital for significant infrastructure public-private partnership (PPP) projects character-
ised by a heavy and irreversible investment over a long period. In PPP projects, the financing strategy relates to the capi-
tal structure of the project and the coordination of the participants’ requirements. In this paper, a system dynamics (SD) 
model is described to analyse the impacts of two types of financing strategies on the needs of creditors, the government, 
and private investors, considering the dynamic and complex characteristics of infrastructure PPP projects. The proposed 
model has been implemented on a PPP highway project. A number of experiments were conducted over a 33-year strategic 
planning horizon as a means of assessing the long-term effects of different financing strategies. The experimental results 
reveal that the model is a useful tool that could support decision-makers in identifying the intervals with different manage-
ment focus of financing risk and comparing different financing strategies to choose the optimal one. It is especially helpful 
for the government to select a financing strategy for infrastructure PPP projects with capital limitations.
Keywords: infrastructure projects, financing strategy management, decision-making, simulation model, public-private 
partnership, capital structure.
Introduction
As a form of project finance and an important alterna-
tive to traditional financing, public-private partnership 
(PPP) is being practiced in a growing number of coun-
tries to provide infrastructure and public service (Burger 
& Tyson, 2006) to relieve the financial burden on govern-
ments and improve the efficiency of public services (HM 
Treasury, 2015). The project using project finance mode 
usually relates to major infrastructure with a long con-
struction period and long operating life, so the financing 
must also be for a long term (Yescombe, 2014). Therefore, 
financing strategy management is especially important 
for infrastructure PPP projects. As an independent eco-
nomic entity, each special purpose vehicle (SPV) in a PPP 
project involves financing strategy decision which results 
in a financing structure (or capital structure). The capital 
structure has an important effect on the total life-cycle 
project cost and consequently, on the financial viability 
of the project (Zhang, 2005). It is also related to risk and 
profit-sharing and therefore concerns coordination of the 
interests of participants, each of whom has different moti-
vations but shares a common goal in a typical PPP project 
(Soomro & Zhang, 2015). Therefore, financing strategy 
management of infrastructure PPP projects provides a 
key focus to promote long-term and stable relationships 
between participants and further the success of projects.
Financing strategy generally concerns the proportions 
of liability and owner equity in various sources of funds, 
usually measured by the ratio of debt to total funding 
(“debt level” or “debt ratio”). To increase financial viability 
and operational transparency, host governments are in-
creasingly opting to offer public funds as equity holdings 
in SPVs. The injection of public funds has expanded the 
focus of the optimal capital structure for balancing private 
and public interests (Feng et al., 2017); this of course im-
plies that the proportion of private and public investment 
in equity capital (“equity structure” or “private/public eq-
uity ratio”) is important and requires some attention.
It has been a focus of previous work to find the opti-
mal debt level of infrastructure PPP projects by studying 
the relationship between debt level and project perfor-
mance. Bakatjan et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2015) found 
the optimal debt capacity for infrastructure PPP projects 
using linear programming. However, in their study, Iyer 
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and Sagheer (2012) assumed that the relationships of debt 
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and internal rate of return 
(IRR) with debt level were nonlinear, and proposed a mod-
el based on a genetic algorithm to find the optimal debt 
level and bid-winning potential for a build-own-transfer 
(BOT) project. Nevertheless, the optimisation described 
in these studies only considered economic goals, meaning 
that the other interests of stakeholders were ignored. Other 
authors suggest that the decisions on capital structure for 
infrastructure PPP projects should balance the interests of 
both the private and the public sector (Zhang, 2005; Shar-
ma et al., 2010; Feng et al., 2017). Sharma et al. (2010) and 
Feng et al. (2017), for example, focused on finding the ap-
propriate private and public equity ratio of infrastructure 
PPP projects to satisfy both private and public sector ob-
jectives. The research mentioned above studied the effect 
of debt level and equity structure on the performance of 
the project, respectively. However, there is no comparison 
of the effects of debt level and equity structure on perfor-
mance. Furthermore, PPP projects can be conceptualised 
as a “system” because the partnership is composed of vari-
ous parties, which interact to produce a desired output (Pa-
padopoulos, 2012). Nevertheless, previous studies did not 
take account of complex and dynamic characteristics within 
the system and reflect the changing relation of financing 
structure and performance of project over time. Therefore, 
the focus of this paper is on the development of a holistic 
and dynamic financing model of strategic management for 
infrastructure PPP projects, using system dynamics (SD) to 
explore the dynamic relationship between financing strat-
egy and project performance and assess the impact of dif-
ferent financing schemes on the aims of participants. Three 
major parties, namely private equity holders, creditors, and 
government, are considered in this paper. The results will be 
useful for decision-makers in their attempts to understand 
fully and accurately the effects of different financing strate-
gies and thus identify the intervals with varying financing 
risks and make optimal strategy choices.
1. Causal loop diagram for financing strategic 
management of infrastructure PPP projects
Following a review of the literature on infrastructure pro-
ject management, an SD model for the strategic manage-
ment of financing for a large highway project was con-
structed to investigate the dynamic interactions within 
and among the physical, social, and financial components 
of infrastructure PPP projects, and the impacts on financ-
ing decisions brought about by these interactions (see Fig-
ure 1). This model and its three constituent modules allow 
policy-makers to understand more clearly the long-term 
impacts of their financing decisions before financial close, 
in order to optimise their benefits.
1.1. Key strategic parameters
To develop the strategic SD model, it was first necessary 
to identify the key strategic parameters that influence the 
behaviour of the infrastructure system within each of the 
three modules shown in Figure 1. The key strategic pa-
rameters (Table  1) were identified based on an in-depth 
interview with management in an expressway company 
and a literature review of infrastructure projects, including 
highway and toll road projects in particular (Yang & Meng, 
2000; Bakatjan et al., 2003; Zhang, 2005; Sharma et al., 2010; 
Hong et al., 2011; Iyer & Sagheer, 2012; Rehan et al., 2013; 
Chen et al., 2015; Rashedi & Hegazy, 2016; Feng et al., 2017, 
2018). These parameters are commonly used in the analysis 
of decision-making in infrastructure projects and must be 
considered in the SD model. They are defined based on a 
full understanding of the system, together with a review of 
the literature and all related theory, encompassing finance, 
welfare economics, and project governance.
In total, 17 key strategic parameters were identified 
and related to each module, as listed in Table  1. These 
parameters include independent inputs (I) and calculated 
values (C). The assumptions made in regard to the inter-
relationships among these parameters are based on avail-
able information, the details of which are discussed in the 
sections that follow.
1.2. Dynamic interactions among strategic 
parameters
To understand the operation of any system, a causal loop 
diagram (CLD) can be used to describe the circular cause-
and-effect relationships that reflect the interaction among 
the different variables and the formation of feedback loops 
as a result of such interactions. Where a system has mul-
tiple interacting feedback loops, it is expected to exhibit 
complex dynamic behaviour (Sterman, 2000). The dia-
gram shows the elements/variables as well as arrows link-
ing these variables, and it also includes a sign (+ or −) on 
each link. A positive link, i.e., (+) polarity, implies that a 
change in the cause produces a change in the effect in the 
same direction. A negative link, i.e. (−) polarity, means 
that a change in the cause produces a change in the effect 










Figure 1. Framework showing the key interactions in a system 
dynamics model
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1.3. Financing feedback loops
The capital required for a PPP project is generally raised 
from equity investors, including private investors, gov-
ernments, and creditors. In most cases, equity financing 
occurs only once during the whole project life-cycle. The 
financing feedback loops reflect the causal link among the 
liability variables and project cash flow.
Figure 2 shows four reinforcing and two balancing 
feedback loops related to financing activities in PPP pro-
jects. Reinforcing loop R1 involves the variables project 
net cash flow, construction delay, project construction cost, 
long-term loan, and long-term loan principal repayment. 
A shortage of net cash flow for a project leads to a pay-
ment delay of the construction costs fund, which results 
in overtime and increased costs of construction. The in-
variability of the equity fund means that increased con-
struction costs result in increased demand for long-term 
loans, thereby leading to more principal repayment and 
less net cash flow on a project. The increase in long-term 
loans also implies more interest and a reduction in pro-
ject net cash flow, which forms reinforcing loop R2. In a 
typical infrastructure PPP project, long-term loans are for 
construction expenditure, and short-term borrowing is 
for supplementing insufficient operational capital. Rein-
forcing loop R3 shows that during the operational period, 
lower net cash flow leads to increased demand for short-
term loans and more short-term loan repayments, causing 
a further reduction in project net cash flow. Reinforcing 
loop R4 involves short-term loan interest. The balancing 
loops B1 and B2 reflect the fact that increased net cash 
flow can mean more repayment of long-term loan prin-
cipal and interest, but the repayment causes a decrease in 
net cash flow.
1.4. Physical condition feedback loops
In this section, a variable called highway condition is in-
troduced. Highway condition refers to the physical state 
of the highway (specifically the  pavement condition in 
this model). It is assumed that highway condition can be 
Table 1. Key strategic parameters of the system dynamic model
Modules Key parameters name Type Assumptions/comments
Finance sector Public investment I Public funds offered by government
Private investment I Investment from private sector
Equity fund C Sum of public and private investment
Long-term loan C Remainder of project construction funds after deducting equity funds
Short-term loan C Determined based on shortfall of net cash flow during period of operation
Project net cash flow C Difference between cash inflow and outflow
Asset sector Project construction cost C Calculated based on planned investment, loan interest during 
construction period and cost of construction delays
Delay cost coefficient I Determined based on similar project experience
Maintenance and 
rehabilitation cost (M&R cost)
C Sum of routine maintenance cost, preventative maintenance cost, minor 
repair cost and major repair cost
Highway condition C Determined based on highway condition index
Highway condition index C Calculated based on highway deterioration determined by Markovian 
process and maintenance and rehabilitation action
Vehicle volume C Calculated based on base volume and change brought by highway 
condition and road toll standard
Road toll income C Calculated based on vehicle volume and road toll standard
Consumer 
sector
Road toll standard C Calculated based on base charging standard and change brought by public 
equity ratio and road charge downward pressure
Traveller dissatisfaction C Determined based on social cost saving
Road charge decrease pressure C Determined based on traveller dissatisfaction
Social cost saving C Calculated based on price that travellers are willing to pay and project cost
Figure 2. Causal loop diagram for finance sector
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expressed numerically and that a high value represents a 
high state of deterioration.
Figure 3 shows feedback loops related to the physical 
condition of the highway. Th e fi gure includes two reinforc-
ing and two balancing feedback loops. When cash fl ow is 
suffi  cient, there are more funds available for maintenance 
and rehabilitation, resulting in an increase in these as-
pects. More expenditure thus brings about a better road 
condition and an increased volume of traffi  c, income from 
road tolls increases as does project cash fl ow. Th is consti-
tutes  reinforcing loop R5, in which there is one important 
delay. Th is occurs when highway conditions improve, but 
the volume of traffi  c does not increase straight away; in-
stead the increase is seen about a year later. Reinforcing 
loop R6 indicates the greater the vehicle volume, the more 
serious the road damage. Balancing loop B3 shows that 
higher levels of maintenance and rehabilitation lead to 
more maintenance and rehabilitation costs and less pro-
ject cash fl ow. Balancing loop B4 refl ects the fact that the 
worse the condition of the asset, the higher the required 
level of  maintenance and rehabilitation.
1.5. Consumer behaviour feedback loops
In contrast to cash fl ow or profi t, public welfare is not gen-
erally easy to measure. Some of the literature on the capi-
tal structure of infrastructure PPP projects fails to account 
for public welfare benefi ts, and in other literature, public 
welfare is measured using diff erent methods. Th is paper 
employs the method used by Yang and Meng (2000) to 
consider the characteristics of highway projects. Th e dif-
ference between the price that consumers (i.e., travellers) 
are willing to pay and the actual cost is termed the social 
cost saving (SCS), which is as a proxy for public welfare. 
For a particular highway project, lower road toll and con-
struction costs result in higher public welfare provided 
that the price that travellers are willing to pay is fi xed.
In Figure 4, two balancing and one reinforcing feed-
back loop involving traveller behaviour and public wel-
fare are shown. Balancing loop B5 involves the road toll 
standard or the road charge per kilometre and per ve-
hicle, road toll income, SCS, traveller dissatisfaction, and 
road toll downward pressure. A higher road toll standard 
results in more road toll income and less SCS, which will 
increase traveller dissatisfaction, meaning that the public 
will apply a downward pressure on price via some form 
of government intervention, in order to reduce the road 
toll standard. If the government exerts more control over 
the project, the road charge decreases. Balancing loop B6
shows the increase in road toll standard leads to an in-
crease of actual cost and further causes a decrease in SCS. 
Th e increase in road toll standard also brings a decrease in 
vehicle volume and an increase in road toll income. Th is 
constitutes reinforcing loop R6 .
2. System dynamics model for fi nancing strategy
2.1. SD simulation modelling
To carry out the SD simulation, the individual CLDs were 
connected to form a stock-and-fl ow diagram as the basis 
for a working quantitative SD model. Th is diagram shows 
the relationships among variables, which have the poten-
tial to change over time. In a stock-and-fl ow diagram, a 
stock is an accumulation of something, like a tank full of a 
liquid. Examples of stocks are net cash fl ow and construc-
tion costs on a project. A fl ow implies the movement of 
something from one stock to another, similar to a pump 
that controls the rate of fl ow between tanks. Examples of 
fl ows are project cash infl ow, project cash outfl ow, and 
long-term loans.
Th e relationship between stocks and fl ows can be de-
scribed mathematically using the following integral (Ster-
man, 2000).
0
0( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )
t
t
Stock t Inflow s Outflow s dt Stock t= − +∫ , (1)
where infl ow(s) and outfl ow(s) represent fl ow into and out 
of stock at any time between the initial time t0 and the 
current time t.
Figure 5 shows the overall structure of the SD model of 
the fi nancing strategy with its three modules: (1) asset sec-
tor module, (2) fi nance sector module, and (3) consumer 
sector module. More than 100 variables and equations are 
involved, though not all details of the model are shown in 
Figure 5 for clarity. Th e signifi cant characteristics of these 
modules are described in the following sections.
Figure 3. Causal loop diagram for asset management sector
Figure 4. Causal loop diagram for consumer sector
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 24(6): 441–455 445
2.2. Model formulation
First. Finance sector module
Th e fi nance sector module includes the sources and direc-
tions of the fl ow of project cash during the construction 
and operational periods. As shown in Figure 5, project 
cash comes from four sources. Th e fi rst source is equity 
investment by project stockholders, including private and 
government investment. Th e second consists of loans, both 
long-term and short-term. A long-term loan is generally 
used during construction because infrastructure assets are 
costly, and the construction period is extended. A short-
term loan can be necessary during the operational period 
in order to supplement the working capital. Income from 
highway tolls is a third source of cash but is only available 
during the operational period. Th e fi nal source is govern-
ment subsidy, which is generally used as means of attract-
ing private investors in view of the generally low-profi t 
margins of infrastructure projects.
Th e project’s cash is used to meet the costs of construc-
tion, operation, and maintenance, as well as repayment of 
interest and principal on loans, income tax, and dividends. 
Th e diff erence between cash infl ow and cash outfl ow is the 
project net cash fl ow, which is a stock variable and refl ects 
the general cash conditions for a particular PPP project 
during construction and operation. As a core variable in 
the fi nance sector module, project net cash fl ow has an im-
pact on related variables in the asset sector and consumer 
sector modules.
Operational net cash fl ow is used for calculating the 
cash fl ow of a project during its operational stage. Opera-
tional cash infl ow covers project income but excludes cash 
infl ows from outside the project, such as loan and equity 
investment, for the payment of maintenance and rehabili-
tation costs, income tax, loan principal and interest.
Second. Asset sector module
Th e asset sector module comprises two stages. Th e fi rst is 
the asset formation stage, in which the project asset costs 
are infl uenced by construction costs, long-term loan inter-
est, and construction delay costs. Whether or not construc-
tion delay occurs is determined by the project net cash fl ow
obtained from the fi nance sector module. If project net cash 
fl ow is not suffi  cient to pay the construction cost, construc-
tion delay occurs, and hence the construction cost increases.
Th e second stage is the asset operation stage, during 
which maintenance and rehabilitation costs are generated. 
Th e pavement condition index (PCI) is a variable to meas-
ure the surface condition of road, which is in a range from 
0 to100. To evaluate the overall condition of the asset, fi ve 
condition states (based on PCI) are used in the model:
– Condition C1: represents assets in excellent condi-
tion, i.e., a PCI between 85 and 100;
– Condition C2: represents assets in good condition, 
i.e., a PCI between 70 and 85;
– Condition C3: represents assets in fair condition, i.e., 
a PCI between 55 and 70;
– Condition C4: represents assets in poor condition, 
i.e., a PCI between 40 and 55;
– Condition C5: represents assets in critical condition, 
i.e., a PCI ≤ 40.
 Figure 5. System dynamics model of fi nancing strategy
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Similarly, the actual cost present value is the discounted 
value of the product of the actual road toll standard, the 
total vehicle volume, and the length of the road. The Social 
Cost Saving, as mentioned above, is obtained by the fol-
lowing Equation (3):
SCS = SCpv – ACpv – Ccpv – M&Rpv – Ipv , (3)
where: SCpv is the accumulated social cost present value; 
ACpv is the accumulated actual cost present value; CCpv is 
the accumulated construction cost present value; M&Rpv 
is the accumulated maintenance and rehabilitation cost pre-
sent value; Ipv is the accumulated interest present value.
SCS less than zero implies that the highway does not 
offer any public welfare, traveller dissatisfaction increases, 
and the public forces the government to reduce the road 
toll standard. This pressure and the equity ratio of the gov-
ernment together determine the change in road charge.
3. Model validation and base case simulation
3.1. Model validation
An SD model is a simplification and abstraction of a real 
system. No SD model is a perfect reflection of reality, but 
it can help understanding, analysis, and solution of com-
plex problems under specific conditions. Therefore, the 
objective of testing and validation of SD models is to en-
sure that the model plays an effective role in the decision-
making process.
The main tests that should be used to validate an SD 
model include verification, validation, and legitimation 
(Coyle, 1983). According to these principles, a series of 
validations were carried out in respect of the modelling 
introduced in this paper. The validation results reveal that:
 – The simulation model developed corresponds to the 
statement of the problem to analyse the impact of 
financing strategy on the interests of participants in 
highway PPP projects.
 – Each equation in the simulation model has dimen-
sional consistency.
 – The value produced for the main variables in the sim-
ulation model is within the normal range when the 
relevant inputs assume extreme values. For example, 
when vehicle volume growth rate suddenly reduces 
to zero, the road toll income and social cost saving 
also decrease, but they nevertheless vary within nor-
mal limits.
The PCI values of each level for road condition refer 
to the industry standard of China (Ministry of Transport 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2008) and Ren’s work 
(Ren, 2016).
To model the process of deterioration of a highway 
asset, the proposed model uses a Markovian deteriora-
tion process, which is one of the most common stochastic 
methods used to model deterioration (Jiang et al., 1988). 
The model predicts the deterioration of a highway by de-
fining discrete condition states and determining the cu-
mulative probability of transition from one state to an-
other over the period of simulation, represented by a tran-
sition probability matrix (TPM). The probability of C1 ~ 
C5 every year can be obtained by Markovian deterioration 






it iMAX iMINt C C C
i
PCI P PCI PCI
=
= +∑ , (2)
where: tPCI  is the value of PCI in year t; itCP  is the 
probability value of highway in condition Ci in year t; 
iMAXC
PCI  is the maximum value of PCI in condition Ci; 
iMINC
PCI  is the minimum value of PCI in condition Ci.
In terms of modelling repair work, the proposed mod-
el considers five Maintenance and Rehabilitation (M&R) 
alternatives, including routine maintenance, preventative 
maintenance A, preventative maintenance B, minor re-
pair, and major repair. The correspondence between asset 
condition, M&R behaviour, and M&R cost are shown in 
Table 2. Each of these five M&R actions has an associated 
effect after the corresponding action is taken, as shown 
in Table 2. For example, a minor repair on an asset with 
condition C4 is assumed to improve that condition from 
C4 to C2.
Third. Consumer sector module
In the consumer sector module, the reactions of travel-
lers to changes in road toll standard and highway condi-
tion ultimately influence public welfare. Change in vehicle 
volume has two possible causes: (1) change in road toll 
standard; and (2) change in highway condition grade. 
Both a lower charging standard and a better highway con-
dition bring about increases in vehicle volume. The flow 
variable social cost present value is the discounted value of 
the product of the road price that travellers are willing to 
pay, the total vehicle volume, and the length of the road. 
Table 2. M&R action, M&R cost and improvement effect corresponding to each asset condition
Asset condition Action taken Repair cost(k RMB/kilometer) Improvement effect
C1 Routine maintenance 80 No obvious improvement
C2 Preventative maintenance A 100 Mitigating pavement deterioration
C3 Preventative maintenance B 150 Mitigating pavement deterioration
C4 Minor repair 1000 Restoring to C2
C5 Major repair 3000 Restoring to C1
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– A reference model used to demonstrate the simula-
tion model actually generates the same type of be-
haviour as would be expected from a similar system.
Hong et al. (2011) used a reference model developed 
by Shen et al. (2002) to validate their SD model for evalu-
ating the sustainability of a highway project. Net cash fl ow 
is a core parameter in the model introduced in this paper. 
Figure 6(a) shows the variation in the discounted cash fl ow 
generated by the model based on data from a practical 
example. Th e distribution is similar in Figure 6(b), which 
relates to a high-speed rail project  (Chen et al., 2015). In 
Figure 6, during the construction stage, a considerable 
cash outfl ow occurs associated with the construction cost, 
and this has a negative eff ect on the net cash fl ow. When 
the project is completed, it moves to the operational stage, 
during which the cash infl ow associated with project in-
come increases gradually, and the accumulated net cash 
fl ow gradually changes from negative to positive. With the 
subsequent rapid increase in project income, the accumu-
lated net cash fl ow will start to increase quickly during the 
later period of operation.
 3.2. Base case simulation
A real case study was used to illustrate the applicability 
of the simulation model in decision-making for a fi nanc-
ing strategy following model testing and validation. Th e 
data were collected mainly from a feasibility study under-
taken for a highway project, in which an 82.4  km four-
lane expressway was envisaged between county A and 
county B in China. Th e total investment was expected to 
be RMB 6476.3 (million). Th e government subsidy was 
RMB 129.53 (million) per year during the construction 
period. Construction was due to begin in 2015 and to last 
three years. Th e franchise period is 30 years and extends 
to 2047. Th e long-term loan period is 24 years and the 
grace period is three years. Th e interest rate on the long-
term loan is 6.15%. Th e construction of the highway is ex-
pected to relieve congestion and facilitate local economic 
and social development. More information about the case 
and the initial value of key parameters can be found in 
the appendix.
With the support of the “Vensim” package, the dynam-
ic model was intended to facilitate analysis of the fi nanc-
ing strategy and optimise fi nancial decision-making for 
this infrastructure PPP project. Th e model considers the 
construction stage and operation stage of highway PPP 
project. Th erefor the simulation period is 33 years (3 years 
construction period and 30 years franchise period).
4. Simulation results and discussion
As mentioned above, the fi nancing strategy infl uences the 
goals of private investors, government, and creditors in 
PPP projects. Private investors attempt to recover their eq-
uity along with the expected profi t from projects with an 
acceptable level of risk. Creditors expect to receive repay-
ment of principal and interest on time (Subprasom, 2004). 
Th e aim of the government is to maximise public welfare 
in respect of the timely completion of construction within 
budget, as well as to achieve high-quality performance in 
operation together with public aff ordability for end-users 
(Zhang, 2005). Decisions made to maximise profi t might 
well reduce any benefi ts from increased public welfare 
(i.e., through increased service price) while maximising 
welfare could bring fi nancial loss and reduced levels of 
solvency for creditors.
Th ree variables were selected to represent the project-
ed interest goals for each party. DSCR relates to project 
solvency, which is the central concern of all creditors. Th e 
ROE on private investment refl ects the return on private 
capital and is the focus of attention for private investors. 
 a) Accumulated discounted cash fl ow generated by fi nancing strategy 
SD model
b) Accumulated discounted cash fl ow generated by reference case in 
(Chen et al., 2015)
Figure 6. Comparison of accumulated discounted cash flow with reference mode
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The main concern of government is public welfare meas-
ured in terms of Social Cost Saving. The calculation of SCS 
is shown in Equation (3), and the equations for DSCR and 
ROE are shown in Equation (4) and Equation (5) below.
( )j j j
j
j







where: the subscript j refers to the jth year; REV is the 
revenue; M&R is the maintenance and repair cost; TAX is 






= × , (5)
where: Np is net profit; Ec is equity capital.
The influence of different financing strategies on 
DSCR, SCS and ROE is discussed below.
4.1. The influence of financing strategy on creditor 
interest
Government regulations in China state that the equity 
capital ratio of a highway project must reach 25%. Thus, 
the maximum value of debt ratio is 75%. Furthermore, 
PPP projects generally require considerable financial lev-
erage to increase the return for investors given that profit 
on this type of project is low (Yescombe, 2014) and there-
fore the debt capacity must not be too low. Therefore the 
simulation model set interval of debt ratio from 75−60% 
and sets up four levels of the debt ratio, which are 75%, 
70%, 65%, and 60%. Moreover, PPP mode plays an im-
portant role in relieving the financial burden on govern-
ments. So private capital usually accounts for the majority 
of project equity fund. Therefore, the model set interval of 
private equity ratio from 100−70%. Four levels of private 
equity ratio are used for each level of debt ratio; these lev-
els are 100%, 90%, 80%, and 70%.
Taking the private equity ratio as 90%, for example, 
as shown in Figure 7(a), the calculation of DSCR begins 
in the fourth year (the start of the operating period) and 
terminates at year 27, based on the loan repayment period. 
The behaviour of solvency presents approximately expo-
nential growth with the impact of reinforcing loop R5. It 
reaches a peak of 16 at the end of the loan repayment 
period. The curved shape of the DSCR for debt ratios of 
75%, 65%, and 60% is similar to the DSCR curve for a 
debt ratio of 70%, but DSCR increases as the debt ratio 
decreases. Furthermore, the shape of the graph with its 
four curves, indicates increased variability over time. The 
reason is that the reinforce loop R1and R2 work in the 
numerator and the denominator of DSCR, respectively. 
Therefore, the performance shows an expansion effect 
and nonlinear relationship. This reinforces the notion that 
decision-makers should use a holistic process for dynamic 
financing planning, rather than a simple one.
Not only does debt level have an impact on DSCR, but 
so too does equity structure, as shown in Figure 7(b), tak-
ing a debt ratio of 70%. When the private equity ratio de-
creases and the public equity ratio increases, road charg-
ing decreases due to the effect of public welfare. Therefore, 
DSCR is highest for a private ratio of 100%. When the 
private ratio drops to 70%, DSCR is less than 1.5 before 
Year 17. The risk of default is high during this period, and 
it is the key interval for risk management. The solvency 
still shows a nonlinear relationship with the change of eq-
uity structure.
As shown in Figure 8, the polyline ABCD shows the 
influence caused by the change of debt ratio on DSCR and 
the polyline abcd shows the impact of private\public eq-
uity ratio on DSCR. When the private equity ratio is 100% 
and the debt ratio changes from 60% to 75% (from point 
A to D), DSCR declines from 27.82 to 13.14. In compari-
son, when the debt ratio is 60% and the private equity ra-
tio changes from 100% to 70% (from point a to d), DSCR 
declines from 27.82 to 4.92. Private equity ratio obviously 
has a greater influence on DSCR than debt ratio and the 
phenomenon has become more obvious over time.
There are two reasons that account for this phenome-
non. Firstly, PPP projects generally require high debt ratio 
to increase the return for investors. Further, some govern-
ments impose restrictions on capital funds through regu-
lation implying that the debt capacity for PPP infrastruc-
ture projects is limited. The public/private equity ratio, by 
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Private Equity Ratio 100% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Private Equity Ratio 90% 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Private Equity Ratio 80% 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Private Equity Ratio 70% 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
a) Simulation results for DSCR influenced by debt level b) Simulation results for DSCR influenced by equity structure
Figure 7. Simulation results for DSCR influenced by different financing strategies (two-dimension)
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contrast, can be adjusted within a wide range. Secondly, 
road toll income, which affected by private/public equity 
ratio, has a bigger impact on DSCR than loan interest, 
which influenced by debt ratio. In summary, both debt ra-
tio and public/private equity ratio have an important effect 
on the solvency of PPP projects, and both effects should, 
therefore, be considered when considering creditor inter-
est, and both can be used to coordinate matters among 
parties of the project. Equity structure should nevertheless 
be the emphasis of financing decisions.
4.2. The influence of financing strategy on public 
interest
As shown in Figure 9(a), by taking a private equity ra-
tio of 90% as an example, the behaviour of public inter-
est shows exponential growth due to reinforce loop R6. 
The SD model begins to calculate SCS from Year 4 and 
it is negative from the start of the operational period up 
to Year 18 when the debt ratio is 70%. The government 
generally suffers more from the stress of reducing charges 
during this period. After that, the SCS starts to increase 
quickly. The shape of the SCS curve for debt ratios of 75%, 
65%, and 60% is similar to the SCS curve for a debt ratio 
of 70%, but SCS usually increases slightly with decreasing 
debt ratio. The difference is mainly a result of loan interest. 
On the other hand, SCS decreases with increasing private 
equity ratio because the road toll standard is higher when 
the government invests less, as shown in Figure 9(b). 
Similar to DSCR, the comparison of the polylines 
ABCD and abcd in Figure 10 indicates that private/public 
ratio has a greater impact on SCS than debt ratio. When 
the private equity ratio is 70% and the debt ratio changes 
from 60% to 75% (from point A to D), SCS declines from 
RMB 6.42 billion to RMB 6.37 billion. In comparison, 
when the debt ratio is 60% and the private equity ratio 
changes from 70% to 100% (from point a to d), SCS de-
clines from RMB 6.42 billion to RMB 5.92 billion. The 
reason for this is not just the wider range of public/private 
equity ratios but also the greater impact of the change in 
road toll standard caused by the change in public ratio 
on SCS. Therefore, it is more effective to adjust the pub-
lic interest by changing the private equity ratio than by 
changing the debt ratio.
The road toll standard is a vital parameter influencing 
SCS in the proposed model. A lower price is better for 
public welfare. The government, on behalf of the wider 
public, can affect pricing policy as project supervisor or 
stockholder. Most authors consider that the government 
limits the maximum price as a supervisor (Feng et  al., 
2017). Our model suggests that while it is true that public 
pressure on government reduces the road toll standard, it 
also illustrates that the government is motivated to reduce 
price when its ownership ratio is high in order to improve 
public welfare.
The definition of SCS in this paper is the difference be-
tween the price that the consumers are willing to pay and 
the actual cost. The measurement of public interest is prob-
lematic and other researchers use different measurement 
methods. Sharma et  al. (2010) measured public interest 
using the sum of three components, namely debt financ-
ing benefits, private equity financing benefits, and oppor-
tunity costs associated with public funds. Yang and Meng 































































Figure 8. Simulation results for DSCR influenced by different financing strategies (three-dimension)
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Private Equity Ratio 90% 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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a) Simulation results for SCS influenced by debt level b) Simulation results for SCS influenced by equity structure
Figure 9. Simulation results for SCS influenced by different financing strategies (two-dimension)
Figure 10. Simulation results for SCS influenced by different financing strategies (three-dimension)
and producer surplus. Feng et al. (2017) suggested that the 
public interest is best served by minimising the level of 
investment by the government. Whether or not minimal 
public funds can bring about maximal public welfare re-
quires further discussion. The influence of financing strat-
egy on public interest would probably be different, using 
different methods of measuring public interest.
4.3. The influence of financing strategy on private 
investor interest
Private investors are the most concerned with project profit-
ability. Taking a private ratio of 90%, for example, as shown 
in Figure 11(a), ROE also shows approximately exponential 
growth. ROE reach to 8% until Year 11 when the debt ratio 
is 70%, during which there is more risk of insufficient prof-
itability since the expected rate of return for private investor 
is 8%. The curved shape of the ROE for debt ratios of 75%, 
65%, and 60% is similar to the ROE curve for a debt ratio of 
70%, but ROE decreases as the debt ratio decreases because 
equity investment increases. As shown in Figure 11(b), by 
taking a debt ratio of 70% as an example, equity structure 
also influences ROE. It decreases with the private equity 
ratio decreases because road toll standard decreases.
As shown in Figure 12, the equity structure also has a 
greater influence on ROE than the debt ratio. When the 
private equity ratio is 100% and the debt ratio changes 
from 75% to 60% (from point A to D), ROE declines from 
3.67% to 2.30%. In comparison, when the debt ratio is 75% 
and the private equity ratio changes from 100% to 70% 
(from point a to d), ROE declines from 3.67% to 2.05%.
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In summary, all DSCR, SCS, and ROE show exponential 
growth. When the performance does not satisfy the require-
ments of participants during the early period of the project 
lifecycle, the focus of risk management is to pay close at-
tention to adverse factors and improve the performance of 
the project. The performance increases rapidly late in the 
project operation period and the focus translates to control 
the risk of benefit allocation among participants and avoid 
excessive growth of one party’s interest at the cost of loss of 
another’s. The proposed model in this paper can accurately 
calculate the starting and endpoint of a different period. 
Furthermore, equity structure has a greater impact on the 
various performance of projects than debt level and it is ef-
fective to balance the interests of participants. Therefore, it 
is the focus of financing decisions.
4.4. Discussion
Effective project financing can help governments to relieve 
the pressure on funding for infrastructure. When a 
government has a fixed amount of funds for an infrastruc-
ture project, the project can attract additional private in-
vestment and loans can be obtained on the basis of govern-
ment funding. From a public standpoint, the government 
wishes to maximise public welfare using a fixed amount of 
capital. The question then arises of which is better for gov-
ernment, loans, or private investment. If the government 
provides RMB 200 million for the highway project men-
tioned above, there are two possible financing strategies. 
The first is to obtain more funds from loans. In this case, 
the highest debt ratio is 75% and the total debt is RMB 
4857.225 million. The private equity investment is therefor 
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a) Simulation results for ROE influenced by debt level b) Simulation results for ROE influenced by equity structure
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Figure 12. Simulation results for ROE influenced by different financing strategies (three-dimension)
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RMB 1419.075 million and the public equity ratio is 3.09%. 
The second strategy involves more private equity invest-
ment. The total equity ratio could be 40% and the debt 
ratio 60% because the project financing mode is character-
ised by high leverage. The total private equity funding is 
therefore RMB 2390.25 million and the private equity ratio 
is 36.91%. The SCS results are shown in Table 3 by simulat-
ing two financing strategies using the SD model developed 
above. As shown in Table 3, the debt strategy can result in 
greater public welfare than the equity strategy. The in-
creased total amount of SCS is RMB 11940 million and 
RMB 398 million per year on average. This suggests that 
the government should raise more loan funds to support 
the highway project within a limited range of debt propor-
tions in order to achieve greater public welfare.
Table 3. Simulation results for SCS influenced by two financing strategies (Unit: RMB million)
Financial scheme
Debt strategy Equity strategy
Amount Proportion Amount Proportion
Public investment 200 3.09% 200 3.09%
Private investment 1419.075 21.91% 2390.52 36.91%
Long-term loan 4857.225 75% 3885.78 60%
Total 6476.3 100% 6476.3 100%
SCS Average per year 9348.26 8950.24
Total 280447.665 268507.171










































Vehicle Volume +20% 1 1
Vehicle Volume +10% 2 2
Base Case 3 3 3
Vehicle Volume –10% 4 4
Vehicle Volume –20% 5 5
a) Sensitivity analysis results of DSCR to vehicle volume
c) Sensitivity analysis results of DSCR to rate of discount
b) Sensitivity analysis results of SCS to vehicle volume


































Rate of Discount 6% 1 1
Rate of Discount 7% 2 2
Rate of Discount 8% 3 3
Rate of Discount 9% 4 4
Rate of Discount 10% 5 5
d) Sensitivity analysis results of SCS to rate of discount
In addition, some of the highway projects are reim-
bursed by government payment according to the perfor-
mance of the project instead of charging from end-users. 
In this case, the income of the project is not affected by the 
public equity ratio but the actual performance. Therefore, 
equity structure has not directly impact on the interests of 
creditors, private investors and government. Thus the deci-
sion making of financing strategy focuses on debt capacity.
4.5. Sensitivity analysis
Various sensitivity tests were conducted involving different 
parameters. The impact of vehicle volume on road toll in-
come is important and has a further influence on the inter-
ests of creditors, government, and investors. Taking vehicle 
Figure 13. Sensitivity analysis results
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ness and usefulness is demonstrated as follows: firstly, the 
simulation results clearly show the interest performance 
of key stakeholders can vary greatly due to the impact of 
various dynamic variables throughout the project life cy-
cle, and this is helpful for identifying the intervals with 
different focus of financing risk management. Secondly, 
different financing strategies have different influences on 
the interests of creditors, government, and private inves-
tors. It is notable that the private/public equity ratio has 
a greater impact on the goals of participants than debt 
ratio. Public equity ratio should therefore become the fo-
cus of financing decisions. Thirdly, the framework is also 
helpful for the government to choose optimal financing 
strategy for providing infrastructure in PPP model based 
on a fixed amount of government funding.
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Appendix
A. The initial value of key parameters
Key parameters name Initial value
Construction period 3 years
Franchise period 30 years
Planned amount invested RMB 6476.3 million
Public investment RMB 152.19 million
Private investment RMB 1521.95 million
Public equity ratio 10%
Government subsidy RMB 388.59 million
Private equity ratio 90%
Debt ratio 75%
Income tax rate 25%
Long-term loan interest rate 6.15%
Short-term loan interest rate 4.35%
Long-term loan 0
Short-term loan 0
Key parameters name Initial value
Forecasted day vehicle volume 20000
Vehicle volume annual growth rate 10%
Selected rate of discount 8%
Delay cost coefficient 0.02
Road length 82.4 kilometres
Project net cash flow 0
Project construction cost 0
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B. The information about the case in the paper
The highway project in this paper connected county A and 
county B in Sichuan province, China. The road is 82.4 km 
long and four-lane expressway. The total investment was 
expected to be RMB 6476.3 (million). The government 
subsidy was RMB 129.53 (million) per year during the 
construction period. Construction was due to begin in 
2015 and to last 3 years. The franchise period is 30 years 
and extends to 2047. The long-term loan period is 24 years 
and the grace period is 3 years. The interest rate on the 
long-term loan is 6.15% and on the short-term loan is 
4.35%. The used discount rate is 8% and income tax rate 
is 25%. The inflation rate is 2% which is incorporated in 
growth rate of road toll and repair cost. The M&R cost is 
calculated according to the forecasted highway condition 
and corresponding repair cost (detailed calculation basis 
is illustrated in section 2.2). The construction of the high-
way is expected to relieve congestion and facilitate local 
economic and social development. The repayment method 
of long-term loan as follows: (1) Interest during the con-
struction period is included in the long-term loan princi-
pal; (2) In the first 10 years of the operating period, if the 
project net cash flow is greater than 0, the interest of the 
current year will be repaid first, and then the principal will 
be repaid. The interest outstanding in the current year will 
be calculated together with the loan principal. (3) From 
the 11th year of the operating period to the 24th year, the 
principal shall be repaid in equal amount every year, and 
the interest of the current year shall be repaid.
